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Morgan: Morgan: Regulation FD:

Law Summary
Regulation FD: 1

Leveling the Playing Field for Some
But Not for Others
I. INTRODUCTION

As regulator of capital markets in the United States, the rules and policies of
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") structure incentives that affect
the allocation of capital resources and determine economic growth.2 Indeed, for
the past eightyears, the SEC energeticallybas beenrestructuring thoseincentives
by expanding its role:3 the SEC has enervated its activities in some areas 4 and
forged new directions for itself in others.
One of those new directions is Regulation Fair Disclosure ("Regulation
FD').
Adopted on August 24, 2000, Regulation FD prohibits selective
disclosure,or anissuer's release of material, nonpublic informationregarding that
issuer to individuals or groups of individuals (typically investmentprofessionals)

1. SelectiveDiselosure and InsiderTrading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716,51,738 (Aug. 24,
2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, & 249) [hereinafter Final Rule].
Specifically, Regulation FD will be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-.103.
2. See WziLAmJ.BAUMoL, THE STOCKMARKETANDECONOMICEFFICIENCY 1-3
(1965); Irwin Friend, The Economic Consequences of the Stockarket,62 AM. EcoN.
REv. 212,212 (1972).
3. This is due, in large part, to Arthur Levitt, Jr.'s role as Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") chairman. Chairman Levitt's eight-year tenure at the helm of the
SEC has been among the most active of any chairman. See Michael Schroeder, Levitt

Will End8Activist Years asSEC ChiefEarlyin 2001, WAL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2000, at Cl.
Chairman Levitt stated: "Our nation faces no higher economic priority than to keep
investors confident of the markets' integrity." Arthur Levitt, Jr., InvestorProtectionin

the
Age
of
Technology,
at
http'/www.see.gov/news/speechspeecharchiNe/19981spb205.txt (last visited Apr. 5,
2001).
4. Randall Smith & Susan Pulliam, US. ProbesInflated Commissionsfor Hot
IPOs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7,2000, at Cl.
5. RegulationFD became active on October 23,2000. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at
51,716. The fact that Regulation FD is controversial is borne out by its fragmentary
supportwithinthe SEC itself. The regulationwas adoptedbyathree-to-one vote. Danny

Hakim, SEC Approves RegulationAgainst Selective Disclosure: Small Investors to
Benefit, ChairmanSays, N.Y. TraEs, Aug. 11, 2000, at CS. The SEC had called for a
responseto aproposedformofRegulationFD. Selective Disclosure and InsiderTrading,

64 Fed. Reg. 72,590 (proposed Dec. 28, 1999) [hereinafter Proposing Release].
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rather than generally releasing the information to the public.' Unfortunately,
Regulation FD promises to impose costs upon corporations and investors that
outweigh any fairness benefits the SEC hopes will accrue.
First, as a backdrop to Regulation FD, this Law Summary will review the
SEC's vision of itself as the investor's protector. In so doing, this Law Summary
considers the workings of the capital markets, the price of information, and the
vital role of selective disclosure. Next, this Law Summary outlines the SEC's
previous attempts to regulate selective disclosure. A presentation of Regulation
FD follows with a focus on its more salient points for corporate counsel. Finally,
this Law Summary concludes with a commentary that is generally skeptical of
Regulation FD's actual results.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The SEC and the Price ofInfornation
The SEC was created by Congress to regulate the securities markets in the
United States To do so, the SEC was empowered with rule-making and
enforcement powers.' For the SEC, regulation of the markets has come to mean
making capital markets fair for investors.9
In its regulation of the markets and protection of the investor, the SEC has
become an information regulator, dictating not only what information must (and
6. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716. Information is material if it "might have
been considered important by a reasonable shareholder who was in the process of
deciding how to vote." Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375,384 (1970). Whether
information is material is a highly fact-specific inquiry. I THOMAS LEE HAZEN, T E LAw
OF SEcurrms REGULATION § 11.4, at 660-61 (2d ed. 1990).
7. Walter Werner, The SEC as a Market Regulator, 70 VA. L. REv. 755, 757
(1984). For an SEC history, see generally JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SEcURITiEs AND EXCHANGE COMINssION AND

MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE (1995). See also SEC, THE WORK OF THE SEC (1986)
(describing the work of the SEC). A critique of the SEC and its policies is offered in
HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DIscLOSuRE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A
PuRPOsE (1979).
8. 1HAZEN, supra note 6, § 1.4, at 15.
9. SEC, supra note 7, at 3 ("The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's
mission is to administer Federal securities laws that seek to provide protection for
investors. The purpose of these laws is to ensure that the securities markets are fair and
honest."). Excerpts from the legislative history suggest this goal is a congressional
mandate: "The purpose of [the Securities Act of 1933] is to ... place the buyer [of a
security] on the same plane so far as available information is concerned, with the seller.
...We want to protect the gullible investor, the investor who has been imposed upon.
This is tremendously important." 77 CoNG. REC. 2,918, 2,920 (1933).
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mustnot) be released ° and what can be done with it," but when,' 2 to whom,U and
inwhatmanner and formitmustbe disclosed. 4 The SEChas declared openly that
fairness, rather than efficiency, is its north star in guiding policy decisions.'
For instance, the antifraud rules state the permissible uses of information.
Such rules protect investors through the prevention of fraud and overreaching,
primarily by deterring market manipulation and insider trading. 6

10. Section 7 of the Securities Act stipulates what information must be contained
in an issuer's registration statement See Securities Act of 1933 § 7, 15 U.S.C. §77g
(1994); see also 1 HAZEN, supra note 6, §§ 3.1-.4, at 86-105 (covering the preparation
and filing of the registration statement).
11. If a person receives inside information regarding a stock and knows or should
have known that he or she received it in breach of a fiduciary duty, he or she must
disclose the information or refrain from trading based upon that information. Dirks v.
SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980).
For an examination of this rule's evolution, see infra notes 112-33 and accompanying
text.
12. Section 5 ofthe Securities Act governs what information a company can release
duringthephases ofregistrationwiththe SEC. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5,15 U.S.C.
§ 77e (1994).
13. The registration requirements stipulate that an issuer must disclose certain
information to the SEC. Furthermore, under § 10(a), the investor must receive in the
prospectus virtually all of the information that would be contained in the registration

statement See Securities Act of 1933 § 10(a), 15 U.S.C. §77aa (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
14. The SEC requires thatpublicly-disclosed documents meetparticular standards.
17 C.F.R. § 230.421 (2000); Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements and
Reports, Securities Act Release No. 33-6276, 21 SEC Docket 1052 (Dec. 23, 1980),

availableat 1980 WL21018;Registrationof Securities Offerings, SecuritiesActRelease
No. 33-6235, 20 SEC Docket 1339 (Sept 2, 1980), availableat 1980 WL 20867. But
see Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 518 (7th Cir. 1989)
("Descriptions inForms 10-Kandregistration statements are almostuselessto individual
investors. Theyrequire absoiptionbyprofessionaltraders and investors.'). For examples
of unacceptable registrations and the possible SEC responses, see also 1 HAZEN, supra
note 6, §§ 3.4-.6, at 103-12.
15. See SEC, supranote 7, at 3.
16. For information on market manipulation, see Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 9(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1994);JAMEsD.CoXETAL.,SEcuRrrmsREGuLATioN:
CASES Am MTIERIALs 656 (2d ed. 1997). See also 2 THOMAs LEE HAZEN, THE LAW
oF SEc
iEsREGLAION § 12.1, at 1-16 (2d ed. 1990) (summarizing § 9,itsremedies,
and its relation to other sections).
Forinformationoninsider trading, see Securities ExchangeActof 1934 § 10(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); Employment ofbManipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 CYFR
§ 240.lOb-5 (2000). For abroadtreatmentofinsidertrading, see generally STEPHENM.
BAImRiDGE, SEcuI'nEs LAW: INSIDERTRADING (1999).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 4 [2001], Art. 8

MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[Vol. 66

On the other hand, the mandatory disclosure rules are the means to achieving
informed investment decisions.'" This goal illustrates the SEC's choice of fairness
over efficiency; by prohibiting free market bidders from buying access to
information, the SEC's disclosure regime suppresses the pricing mechanism
inherent in differentially valuable data.' Disclosure rules effectively lower the
price of information for individual investors. 9 Moreover, disclosure rules work
to create a flow of information that eliminates informational asymmetries among
market participants.20 Ideally, such laws will raise the overall level of information
in the market, which, in turn, will increase the stock market's fundamental price

17. Securities Act of 1934 § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1994 & Supp. 1999); Securities
Act of 1934 § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 77f (1994 & Supp. 1999). See generally 1 HAZEN, supra
note 6, §§ 3.1-.8, at 86-125 and §§ 4.1-.29, at 126-232 (covering the steps in the federal
registration process and the exemptions fromthe Securities Actregistrationrequirements,
respectively).
18. The laws against insider trading end in the same result. Rather than allowing
insiders to auction their information to the highest bidders, the securities laws delay such
information from entering the market until it can be properly disclosed. Dirks'spersonal
benefit test, for instance, is a prohibition on insiders bidding (the personal benefit for the
insider) on valuable information and then trading on it. See infra notes 116-33 and
accompanying text
19. The disclosure rules do this by requiring companies to disclose, which makes
information more readily available to researchers. See supra notes 10-14 and
accompanying text. Thus, researchers caninvest less time searching for company or stock
information than they would have to in the absence of such disclosure requirements.
20. See SELIGMAN, supra note 7, at 604.
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efficiency. 2' When prices more accurately reflect stocks' value, the allocation of
resources will be optimal.2

But the federal securities laws do notmandate the release of allinformation.
Instead, much information exists in pockets, stored in isolated sources. Rational
investors are motivated to discover such information because to trade from a
vantage point of superior information is to shift the risk of loss to other investors.
Despite this, information-a predicate of market efficiency-tends to be
underproduced. This apparent paradox is attributable to two reasons.
First, information is like any other good in that it has a price. The price of

information about a stock includes retrieval,' processing,24 and verification
costs.'

Given these costs, the individual investor searching for information

21. Victor BrdneyInsiders,Outsiders,andlnformationaAdvantagesUnderthe
FederalSecuritiesLaws, 93 HARV. L. REv. 322,334 (1979). Fundamental efficiencyis
a measure ofthe degree to which the market price of a security expresses the fundamental
worth of an issuer. Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: RegulatingHow CorporationsSpeakto
the Market, 77 VA. L. REv. 945, 968 (1991). Fundamental efficiency is distinguished
from market efficiency and informational efficiency. Market efficiency can refer
generallyto eitheramarket's degree offundamental efficienc orinformational efficiency.
Id. at 968-69. Informational efficiency is the degree to which a stock price reflects the
varying levels of information about the stock and is measured by one of the three forms
of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis C(ECMIT'). Id.at 965.
The weak form of the ECMH posits that the price of any given security will reflect
a security's histor, that is, the prices at which the security has been bought and sold.
DOUGLAS IR EERYET AL., PRncipLES OF FinANcIALMANAGEmtr 226 (1998). The
semistrong form claims that prices quickly and neutrally impound public information
about a stock. JAmEs . LoRsEET AL., THE STocKMm=E: THEORIES AND EVMMCE
65-73 (2d ed. 1985). The strong form of the ECMH asserts that prices reflect all
information pertaining to a stock, including illegally-used inside information regarding
an issuer. EMRYET AL., supra,at 226; LORmETAL., stpra,at 73-77. Mostagreethat
markets in the United States display semistrong efficiency. LORIBET AL., supra,at 73.
22. Brudney, supra note 21, at 334.
23. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA.L.REV. 549,594(1984). Gilson and Kraakmannote that acquisition
costs are oftwo types: (1) the cost ofuncovering or "producing the information," and (2)
the costs ofpurchasinginformationproducedbyanother. Id. Informationnecessaryfor
effective decisionmaking tends to be spread across various sources. THOMAS SOWEIL,
KNOWLEDE AD DECISIONS 26 (1996). Thus, part of the costs of acquisition logically
will include assembling pertinent data from disparate sources.
24. Gilson& Kraakman supranote 23, at 594. Processing costs include not only
the actual analysis, but also the training necessary to interpret accounting, financial, and
economic data. Gilson & Kmaakman, supranote 23, at 594. The professional's vage
expresses these costs. Gilson & Kxaakman, supranote 23, at 594.
25. Gilson& Kraakman, supranote23, at 594. Verification costs are also twofold.
Gilson & Kraakman, supranote 23, at 594; see also supranote 23 (noting the duality of
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quickly reaches the point of diminishing returns: his or her opportunity costs
become greater than the result of his or her untrained efforts. The price of
profitable information 26 simply becomes too high.
Second, information is underproduced because of its nature. Information is
a pure public good;27 therefore, a researcher cannot completely internalize the
benefit of his or her searches.2 Others, free riders, trade on the basis of the
researcher's information without paying for it in an attempt to profit from the
researcher's efforts.2' Thus, one has an incentive to invest one's resources

acquisition costs). The information producer must audit the information, whereas a
subsequentpurchasermust confinnthetruthfiulness oftheproducer. Gilson& Kraakman,
supranote 23, at 594-95. Because oftheir reputational interests, securities analysts have
an incentive to bond the information they bring to the market. Donald C. Langevoort,
InvestmentAnalysts andthe Law ofInsider Trading,76 VA. L. REv. 1023, 1030 (1990).
For a discussion on this latter point and how it relates to the lemons market problem, see
infra note 59.
26. The qualifier "profitable" is important. Information that is widely available in
the marketplace is not very valuable. Given a semistrong market, such information is
already impounded into the price; as a result, an investor cannot profit from such
information.
27. Apublic good is broadly defined as any good or service that provides benefits
to all of society, such as clean air or national defense. See KARL E. CASE & RAY C. FAIR,
PRINCIPLEsOFECONOMICS459 (2ded. 1992). Others further differentiate betweenpublio
goods and collective goods. So classified, apublic good (as opposed to a collective good)
is any good or service that is nonrivalin consumption-thatis, it can be provided to any
amount of people at no extra cost. Harold Demsetz, The PrivateProductionof Public
Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293, 295 (1970); see also CASE & FAIR, supra, at 459.
Collective goods are nonexcludable, meaning those goods that the producer cannot
prevent others from consuming. Demsetz, supra,at 295; see also CASE & FAIR, supra,
at 459. Finally, a "pure public good" combines bothinonrivalness and nonexcludability.
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness,Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructingthe
Coin of the Realm in the InformationAge, 95 Nv. U. L. REv. 443, 451-52 (2001).
28. Krawiec, supra note 27, at 453-54; see also RICHARDA. POsNERi, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAw 36 (5th ed. 1998) (noting that,without property rights in a resource,
one has no assurance that one will reap the benefits of one's cultivation of that resource).
See generally MARK SEIDENFELD, ICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND
ECONOMICS 63-66(1996) (explaining the economics behind externalities). Alternatively,
a paid researcher is undercompensated for his or her investigative efforts because free
riders are benefitting from the researcher's labor. John C. Coffee, Jr.,MarketFailureand
the Economic Casefor aMandatoryDisclosure System, 70 VA. L. REv. 717, 726-27
(1984) [hereinafter Coffee, Market Failure]. Either way, the net effect is that the level of
market information is suboptimal. Id. at 726.
29. JohnF. Barry, Ill, The Economics ofOutsideInformationandRule JOb-5, 129
U. PA. L. REv. 1307, 1327 (1981).
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elsewhere, leaving the information undiscovered or for someone else to discover,
or even to free ride one's self.
The federal disclosure rules compensate for some of this underproduction by
creating a floorbeneath whichthe level ofinformation inthe market cannot sink. 0
This provides the minimum for informed trading decisions," lowers the price of
information, and reduces
duplicative search costs, freeing researchers to spread
32
elsewhere.
efforts
their
In summary, information is critical to market efficiency. As regulator of
information and the capital markets, the SEC has attempted to create efficient and,
more importantly, fair markets. Yet, the federal security laws do not require
release of all information or even of all material information. Thus,
gaps-isolated data waiting to be bundled to create the basis for investment
decisions-exist and will continue to do so.33 To receive the socially optimal
amount of information, then, there must be some mechanism, beyond the federal
laws, that provides incentives to produce information and bring it to the market.

30. Coffee, Market Failure,supranote 28, at 733.
31. Butsee William 0. Douglas &George E. Bates, The FederalSecuritiesActof
1933,43 YALEL.J. 171, 172 (1933) ('Those who need investment guidancewillreceive
small comfort from the balance sheets, statistics, contracts, and details which the
prospectus reveals.'); Homer Kripke, The Myth of the InformedL4aman, 28 Bus. LAW.
631, 632 (1973) (' My theme is that the theory that the prospectus can be and is used by
the lay investor is a myth. It is largely responsible for the fact that the securities
prospectus is fairly close to worthless.').
32. Coffee, Market Failure, supra note 28, at 733-34. But cf. FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK&DANIELR. FISCHEL, THEECONOMIC SucruRmoF CORpORA3ELAW
298-300 (1991) (assertingthatit is not only disclosure that benefits investors but also the
nature of the information that is disclosed).
33. The SEC has tried to ease search costs by allowing forintegrated disclosure and
creating a centralized data repository in the form of its Electronic Data Gathering,
Analysis and Retrieval System ("EDGAR"). Integrated disclosure allows issuers to
streamline by combining otherwise duplicati-e registration materials required by the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act. Adoption of Integrated Disclosure Systems,
Securities Act Release No. 33-6383, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 72,328 (Mar. 3, 1982); see also 1 HAzEN, supra note 6, § 3.3, at 97-102
(explaining integrated disclosure and its requirements). Anyone can acquire documents

filed through EDGAR by accessing the SEC's EDGARweb site. SEC, SEC Filingsand
Forms (EDGAR), athttp://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last modified 1ay 29,2001).
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B. The Securities Analyst, InformalRelationships,'4
and Systemic Benefits
As noted, selective disclosure is a mechanism that provides incentives to
produce information and bring it to the market. Selective disclosure fulfills an
interstitial need for revealing information existing somewhere between what is
required bymandatory disclosure rules and what may not merit the costs ofpublic
or voluntary SEC disclosure. Selective disclosure has resulted from the tripartite
relationship among issuer, analyst, and investor. To understand this relationship
and selective disclosure's important role, this Law Summary examines the
analyst's role in relation to the publicly-traded company and the investor.
In their capacity as informational intermediaries, security analysts are hired
by both individuals and firms in the hopes that the analysts' product will provide
a profitable informational advantage.35 Financial institutions, such as mutual
funds and brokerage firms, hire analysts as part of the basket of services offered
to investors; these entities also may use the analysts to trade for their own
accounts.36 Individual investors also may hire analysts by retaining the services
of an investment management firm.1Y In both situations, the analyst is employed
to discover new information about securities issuers and make recommendations
to clients, whether institutional or individual.
One of the ways an analyst does this is by researching the public information
about the issuer, such as SEC filings or economic data.38 However, merely
gathering and assessing public information soon leads to diminishing returns for
the analyst. The semistrong form of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis
("ECMI") instructs that such information is already impounded into the price of
the security. 9 According to the semistrong orthodoxy, the analyst's research of
publicly available information does not add to society's wealth of information
regarding that stock. Some new way of adding material, nonpublic information
34. As used herein, an informal relationship will refer not only to a familiar or
collegial relationship between parties, but also to an institution for decisionmaking. See
SOWELL, supranote 23, at 23-30.
35. See Langevoort, supra note 25, at 1025; see also David Hirshleifer et al.,
Security Analysis and Trading Patterns When Some Investors Receive Information
Before Others, 49 J. FIN. 1665, 1665 (1994) ("By [receiving information] first, an
investor can exploit this information to great advantage. Information that is uncovered
only slightly later is less valuable even if it has not yet been publicly revealed").
For purposes of this Law Summary, a "security analyst" refers to professionals hired
to acquire information and make recommendations about securities.

36. Langevoort, supranote 25, at 1026.
37. Langevoort, supra note 25, at 1026.

38. Barry, supranote 29, at 1308.
39. See SELIGMAN, supranote 7, at 605.
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is necessary in order to increase informational and fundamental efficiency.
Selective disclosure is this new way, and it has developed, in part, as a result of
the relationship between the analyst and a company.
In matters not governed by the securities laws, the relationship between an
analyst and an issuer is an informal one because their interactions arise not as a
result of a forced institutional arrangement but, instead, are voluntary and, thus,
free of the costs of imposed relationships." For instance, the parties need not pay
the costly "insurancee& 1 that is required to protect against future adverse costs in
an imposed relationship; in the informal relationship, either one party's decision
is unilaterally sufficient to make decisions, orhe or she is part of a relationship in
which the others are adequately familiar with the setting to make such insurance
superfluous.4 2 Institutional relationships, on the other hand, are less
self-contained, typically 43involving costly formalities at various stages of the
decision-making process.
Moreover, informalrelationships allowthepartiesto negotiatethe exchanges
ofthatinteraction. Knowledge conveyed in the relationship canbeindividualized
to the parties' needs, as opposed to the categorical nature of institutional
arrangements.' That knowledge also can be given incrementally, allowing the
parties to choose the costs and benefits they will incur.4
In the securities context, this means the issuer is free to decide to whom it
will communicate and the level of that cormnunication 4 -in other words, to

40. One shouldnot be overly categoricalhere. Obviously, theserelationships exist
ona continuum. A recently-employed financial manager, for instance, can "inherit" a set
of analysts with whom the company typically communicates. Thus, though the manager
maybe ableto exercise some discretion as to the degree ofthat contact, his discretion will
be constrained by the larger corporate culture. If the firm is smaller and less followed
than others, the pressure will be greater to maintain that set of analysts so as to maintain
lower disclosure costs. See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
41. See SOWELL, supranote 23, at 24. These costs-whether formalized requests
to a bureaucratic authority, efforts to make clear one's meaning, or sensitivity to an
organization's culture-constitutethe lubricationrequired whencoordinating with others
toward a goal. See SOWELL, supranote 23, at 24.
42. See SOWELL, supranote 23, at 24.
43. See SOWELL, supranote 23, at 24. These formalities may include review by
peers, committees, or superiors.
44. See SOWELL, supranote 23, at 24.
45. See SOWELLsupranote 23, at 24. Professor Sowell explains this byreferring
to package deals. With their "take-it-or-leave-it" nature, package deals reduce
consumers' options. See SOWELL, supranote 23, at 28-29. As noted earlier, the federal
disclosure rules are a type of package deal: certain information must be disclosed, and
the consumer of information must take it or leave it.
46. Again, there may be some corporate constraint here. See supranote 40.
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selectively disclose. Of course, the issuer's relationships with analysts are still
framed by the securities regulation laws. In his or her relations with an analyst,
an issuer official still must be aware of possible liability based on either
entanglement or adoption theories.47 But within the pre-Regulation FD legal and
corporate constraints, the analyst and the issuer official have room to negotiate the
terms of their interactions; to agree incrementally for the information to be
revealed; and to signal the worth of the information disclosed by their respective
willingness to incur the costs of the disclosure.
Typically, selective disclosure occurs between an analyst and a corporate
insider.4" These contacts can occur on a sliding scale of formality, such as group
meetings49 or conference calls that present a company's plans,5 0 or, more
informally, an individual analyst can telephone a company insider to clarify
previously- released information. 1
In these interactions, the issuer and the analyst can negotiate what
information will be released to the analyst. Because it is on their terms and
tailored to their needs, the information is disclosed at a much lower cost than it
would cost either of them otherwise. 2

47. Under the entanglement theory, a company becomes liable for an analyst's
report when that company's level of involvement in the preparation of the report rises to
such a level that it is as ifthe company had provided the information. Elkind v. Liggett
& Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 1980). "Generally, when a company engages
in conduct that expressly or impliedly represents to the analyst that the information being
prepared by the analyst is correct or is endorsed by the company, liability under
'entanglement' theory is possible." Bruce A. Hiler, Dealing with SecuritiesAnalysts;
Recent Guidance,28 SEc. REG. L.J. 180, 192 (2000).
The adoption theory imposes liability on an issuer for post-publication approval of
an analyst's report. In re Cypress Semiconductors, 891 F. Supp. 1369, 1377 (N.D. Cal.
1995).
48. See Langevoort, supra note 25, at 1026.
49. Langevoort, supra note 25, at 1026. The New York Stock Exchange and the
SEC recommend that publicly-traded companies maintain an open door policy with
respect to analysts. J. Scott Colesanti, Bouncing the Tightrope: The SEC Attacks
Selective Disclosure,But ProvidesLittle Stability for Anaolsts, 25 S.ILL. U. L.J. 1, 19
(2000).
50. Jeff D. Opdyke, IndividualsPick Up on Conference Calls, WALL ST. J., Nov.
20, 2000, at C1 ("Conference calls are telephone sessions, typically lasting an hour or so,
in which management lays out its views on the company's recent performance and
prospects for the future; dozens of analysts then lob questions at the executives."); see
also infra notes 186-88 (discussing the SEC's suggestion that issuers post information
regarding details of upcoming conference calls in order to provide sufficient notice under
Regulation FD).
51. Langevoort, supra note 25, at 1026.
52. In 1980, the cost for disclosure under the SEC regime was estimated at more

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol66/iss4/8

10

Morgan: Morgan: Regulation FD:

2001]

REGULATIONFD

Forexample, considerthe financial officerwho sees anopportunityto benefit
the issuer by disclosing a piece of material, nonpublic information to the market
that is not mandated by the disclosure rules. In such a situation, the range of
options facing the officer depends upon the issuer's size. The issuer could file the
information with the SEC, but this is an expensive route to disclosure. 3 The
formal relationship between an issuer and the SEC requires rigid filing methods
and rules-apackage deal. 4 Because of these costs, larger companies will have
the ability to use this option more often than smaller companies.
Disclosing to the media is an option but, again, not an equal one for all
companies. Press releases can be costly, and a smaller company must pay a
higher price for such disclosure than a larger company must pay.55 Given finite
newspaper space and airtime, press releases may not be reported in a timely
fashion, if at all, by the various media outlets.56 Thus, in disclosing equivalent
information, a smaller company may have to make a bigger "splash" than a
blue-chip firm.5

than $1 billion. SusANM. PHmLipS & J.
RicHARD ZECHER, T1m SEC AND nm PUBLIc
INTEMST 51 (1981).
53. In 1975, a large company (defined as having $2.6 billion in assets) spent 0.034
percent of its assets onmandated disclosure. PHnmLPs & ZECHER, supra note 52, at 50
table 3.3. For a small company (ie., a firm with $26 million in assets), the same
disclosure increased to 0.46 percent PHILLIPS & ZECHER, supranote 52, at 50 table 3.3.
54. See SOWELL, supranote 23, at 28-29.
55. John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the SecuritiesAnalyst, N.Y. L.J., May 30,
1991, at 5 [hereinafter Coffee, SEC]. One financial officer stated: "A press release has
been generally a ratherpainful thing to get out It takes time, and generally we do it with
a lot ofpeople. A lot of things are in that pot, and [it requires] the time or the luxury to
go throughthat whole process." SEC v. Bausch&Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1242

(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
56. Professor Coffee notes that SEC v. Stevens exemplifies this fact. Coffee, SEC,
supranote 55. Though Ultrasystems (the issuer) released a press release on Friday, it
was not until the following Monday that the news was reported and the stock's price was
affected. Coffee, SEC, supra note 55. Indeed, it seems that the media's role is
underestimated, given its incentive structure and constrained resources, it stands to reason
that the media may act as a gatekeeper for some information that, in turn, could affect
informational efficiency.
57. As scholars prune assumptions fromthe ECMH, one of the remaining questions
is the degree to which the market absorbs information regarding small capitalization
stocks such as those on the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated
Quotations ("NASDAQ"). See Coffee, SEC, supranote 55. In 1991, there were twentyseven percent fewer Wall Street analysts than in 1987. Debbie Galant, Is Small
Beautiful?, 25 J. INVEsTG 169, 169 (1991). In recent years, analysts have beentaxed
bymore emerging companies thatneedto be followed. Id. This has forced many analysts
to drop companies from their rolls, leaving those companies, and even entire sectors,
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Alternatively, a public company's financial officer can disclose selectively
to analysts. Comparatively, the costs are lower.5" The company need not pay the
price of disclosure required by the SEC or incur the costs associated with a press
release; at the same time, the company may realize the benefits by releasing the
informaion. For his or her part, the analyst is able to acquire facts crucial to his
or her analyses, which leads to more accurate projections and models.
Moreover, a rational company director knows that other companies are also
disclosing to the market. To compensate for adverse selection, the issuer relies
upon the analyst to bond the information disclosed.59 Thus, the analyst acts as
insurance for the issuer: because the analyst has his or her own reputational
incentives, the analyst will not spread the information without being reasonably

certain of its veracity.' °
The issuer also turns to the analyst based on liability concerns.61 The
informal nature of their contact leaves an issuer and its agents less vulnerable to

unwatched. Id.
With this decrease in the ratio of analysts to companies (especially smaller,
sparsely-traded companies), it is questionable whether semistrong efficiency applies to
some companies. See Coffee, SEC, supra note 55. This is particularly true for those
companies traded in the over-the-counter markets or not included in markets as large as
the NASDAQ. See Cox ET AL., supranote 16, at 39.
58. That is not to saythey are costless. Whenresponding to aninquiry "concerning
rumors, unusualmarket activity, possible corporate developments or any othermatter, the
statement must be materially accurate and complete." In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act
Release No. 22,214, 33 SEC Docket 874 (July 8, 1985). The cost of selectively
disclosing, then, mayinclude the steps (i.e., time and resources) necessary to carry out the
duty to update the disclosure or to implement policies to protect the issuer. Under the
entanglement theory, an issuer has no duty to update or correct third-party reports that the
issuer did not review or approve. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 163 (2d
Cir. 1980).
59. See Langevoort, supra note 25, at 1030; see also Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel,MandatoryDisclosureandtheProtectionofInvestors, 70 VA. L. REV.
669, 675-76 (1984) (highlighting the ways issuers can prove the quality of their stock,
such as selling through investment bankers, having their managers hold large volumes
of the stock, and issuing debt).
The compensation that issuers' officials must make is reminiscent of the classic
lemons market scenario: producers of quality goods do not market or must raise their
prices to compensate for low-quality producers who bank on consumers' lack of
discernment. For a technical analysis of the lemons market, see George A. Akerlof, The
Marketfor "Lemons ": Quality Uncertaintyandthe MarketMechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON.
488 (1970).
60. Thus, the benefit of bonding wraps around to the client, making it a positive
sum gain.
61. Langevoort, supra note 25, at 1029.
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a similar disclosure made publicly.' The informal relationship between the
analyst and the issuer's agent allows them to agree about who will bear the risks
ofthe information disclosed as the information canbe offthe record or tentative.6
Further, when anissuermustreleaseinformationto all, that informationmust
be simplified so that it is understood at the layman's level: hence, limited
understanding requires limited disclosure.' The informal relationship provided
by selective disclosure broadens the options available to a disclosing company,
allowing the issuer to fine tune its message to the recipient, improving the
disclosure's information quality and increasing the informational efficiency of the
market 65
Conversely, if anissuer wants to keep secret the details of a stock-enhancing
venture or development before it comes to fruition, a financial officer can use the
adaptable, informal relationship with an analyst to introduce the information
without specifics to the market.' Hence, the price is moved withoutjeopardizing
the project.
Turning to the investor, itis easy to see how a rational investor could benefit
fromthe practice of selective disclosure to an analyst Quite simply, the investor
needs informationto make informed investment decisions.' Dueto their extensive
training and experience, analysts enjoy scale economies in their research efforts

62. Langevoort, supranote 25, at 1029-30.
63. It also can be improperly traded or misused. Some have suggested that a
financial officer would choose to disclose to those analysts who would trade material,
nonpublic information for favorable reports, especially when the analysts' firm ovns the
stock and, hence, will trade onthe information early. Jelfrey M Laderman, WailStreet's
Spin Game: StockAnalysts Often Have a HiddenAgenda, Bus. V/K., Oct. 5, 1998, at
148; Langevoort, supra note 25, at 1040-42. However, reputational costs are natural
constraints upon this practice. Giving biased recommendations leads to poor results,
which decreases an analyst's subscribers. See Langevoort, supranote 25, at 1043.
64. Langevoort, supranote25, at 1043. Disclosed documents must bereadable to
the average investor, free of superfluous technical jargon, and contain visual aids, such
as charts and graphs. 17 C.F.R1 § 230.421 (2000); Preparationand Filing ofRegistration
Statements andReports, Securities Act Release No. 33-6276,21 SEC Docket 1052 (Dec.
23, 1980), availableat 1980 WL 21018; Registrationof Securities Offerings, Securities
Act Release No. 33-6235, 20 SEC Docket 1339 (Sept. 2, 1980), availableat 1980 WIL
20867.
65. See Langevoort, supra note 25, at 1030. Informational efficiency may not
improve, however, if an analyst obscures the grounds for his or her conclusions or
recommendations when speaking to the market.
66. See Langevoort, supranote 25, at 1031.
67. See Langevoort, supranote 25, at 1031.

68. See Langevoort,supranote 25, at 1031; see alsoPeter Lloyd Davies &Michael
Canes,StockPricesandthe PublicationofSecond-Handnformation,51 J.BUs. 43, 55

(1978) (suggesting that the analyst's product provides a profit opportunity to clients).
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as compared to untrained investors; for the analyst, the price of retrieving,
processing, and verifying information is much lower than for the untrained
does not trade in a large enough volume to justify
investor.69 The typical investor
70
the associated research costs.

A multitude of investors researching companies creates substantial overlap
and, hence, wasteful duplication of effort; the analyst streamlines this process."
This liberates the investor to specialize in his or her own chosen area when, after
all, he or she does not want to incur the costs of becoming a security analyst but,
instead, wants the financial benefits of employing one.'
As noted, much of the information distributed by issuers to the public must
be generalized-stripped of its technicality?' Disclosures to the SEC are
formalized and costly to attain.74 With selective disclosure, the securities analyst
can bring that information (in addition to other accumulated data) to the investor
less expensively in a form particularized to the client, whether it be mere
recommendations for the individual or a synthesized projection for an institution."'

69. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 23, at 601 (noting that analysts have a
"functional advantage... to process information more cheaply than non-specialists').
70. Gilson & Kraakman, supranote 23, at 598 n.152.
71. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 59, at 675. Of course, too many analysts
following the same companies also can be inefficient. See Coffee,MarketFailhtre,supra
note 28, at 733-34.
72. Easterbrook & Fischel, supranote 59, at 675. The SEC would argue that this
supposition is contradicted by six-thousand comment letters. See infra note 86.
73. See Langevoort, supranote 25, at 1030.
74. See Langevoort, supra note 25, at 1030 n.25.
75. Some argue that there is little value to this service and that analysts in this
capacity are merely middlemen. However, this notion is a variant ofthephysicalfallacy,
or the "beliefin the invariable value of a physical object." SowELL,supranote 23, at 67.
Though this notion accounted for the prohibition of charging interest on borrowed money
in medieval times, the middleman persisted because he acquired valued goods from
producers and stored them until consumers needed them at a later time. SoNvELL, supra
note 23, at 68. The middleman assumed the risk ofthis service, and, in so doing, changed
the value of goods by relocating them in time and space at less cost than either the
producer or the consumer. SoWELL, supranote23, at 68. Presumably, the producer and
consumer would deal witheach other directly but for the middleman's economies of scale
in inventory management and storage. SOWELL, supra note 23, at 68.
Though information is intangible, a similar process works in the informational
context. The analyst acquires the information from the issuer (producer) and stores it,
albeit briefly. Typically, this information is combined with the other data that the analyst
has. The analyst then can provide (relocate) it and any other analyst services to the
investor (the consumer, who is unfamiliar with the process of information production and
acquisition) at an agreed price and package. There is much room for debate on this point
today, however, with the increased use of the Internet and the modem access to securities
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Finally, selective disclosure reduces the cost of inside access for the average
investor. The analyst offers the opportunity for such access and sophisticated
market analysis to the individual investor in exchange for the analyst's fee. Ifthe
individual investor is unwilling to pay the price (in terms of opportunity costs)
required for such insight and access, he or she need only avail himself or herself
of the analyst's services.'
Ultimately, selective disclosure is a Coasian solution:" after the initial
allocation (andlaterincrementaljudicial development)' ofrights by Congress and
the SEC, issuers' officials, analysts, and investors contractually have arrived at
selective disclosure in order to solve their respective problems efficiently. The
transaction costs are low because investors, analysts, and issuers are all cheaply
identifiable to one another, and each has an incentive to contract with the other.
For the issuer and its officers, the informal relationship with the analyst is a lowcost disclosure and bonding mechanism; for the investor, it is a means to
understandable inside information that allows for division of labor.
In addition, systemic benefits flow from this arrangement. Through the
increased production of information, capital resources are more optimally
allocated. All investors benefit through the production of information as
informational, andthenfimdamental, efficiencyincreases. Hence, those investors
who do not wantto engage the services of an analyst can "free ride" on the market
impoundment of the information. 9 They do this by using the company's stock
price as a signal of quality as judged by the market.

information.
76. See Langevoort, supranote25, at 1029. Forcommentaryonthe fimess ofthis
arrangement, see also Frank H. EasterbrookInsiderTrading,SecretAgents, Evidentiary
Privileges,and the ProductionofInformation, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 330 C'People
do nothave or lack 'access' in some absolute sense. There are, instead, different costs of
obtaining info
on.... The different costs of access are simply a function of the
division of labor ... [B]ut unless there is something unethical about the division of
labor, the difference is not unfair.'); Daniel R. Fischel, InsiderTradingandInvestment
Analysts: An EconomicAnalysis ofDirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 13
HoFsTRAL. REv. 127, 145-46 (1984) (arguing that those who do not employ analysts
earn lower returns, but they do not incur the costs of those services).
77. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1
(1960) (hypothesizing that, given an initial allocation of rights and low transaction costs,
parties will contract to a Pareto-efficient arrangement).
78. See infranotes 95-143 and accompanying text.
79. But cf.Langevoort, supranote 25, at 1038 C(Aninvestorpossessing nonpublic
infornation will purchase or sell additional securities of the issuer, but unless and until

that information is somehow transmitted to other participants, the price vil continue to
reflect the uninformed view.").
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Also, as the practice of selective disclosure increases fimdamental efficiency,
it benefits shareholders. With the separation of ownership and control in the
publicly-traded firm, the shareholders, as residual claimants, must incur the
monitoring costs associated with that firn. However, it is impossible for the
shareholders to monitor the firm's relevant procedures and policies cost
effectively; more realistically, the shareholders evaluate the company based upon
its price."1 To the extent the analyst's product contributes to the fundamental
efficiency of an issuer's stock (whether indicating high or low quality), monitoring
costs are reduced, and the shareholders can make more accurate judgments.'
Selective disclosure, then, creates apositive externality in economizing onthe
requirements for market efficiency and contributing to the efficient division of
labor in society. Evidently, selective disclosure has many benefits to offer the
market and individual investors. Nonetheless, the SEC disagrees that those
benefits outweigh the costs.'
C. The SEC and the JudicialResponse to Selective Disclosure
According to the SEC, issuers' selective disclosure undermines the SEC's
goal of fair and fllly-informed markets.' Hence, in the past, the SEC has sought
to limit selective disclosure.' This subsection explores how the SEC and the
courts progressively have diverged in their respective treatment of liability for
selective disclosure.
SEC officials have been quite candid about their reasons for disfavoring
selective disclosure. With its ostensible tendency to favor analysts and their
clients, selective disclosure jeopardizes the faith that investors have in capital

80. MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTuRY 20-21 (1995).
81. See SOWELL, supra note 23, at 66 ('While the residual claimants cannot
monitor the process, they can easily monitor the results.").
82. Michael C.Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior,Agency Costs andOwnershipStructure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 354-55 (1976).
83. This disagreement is vehement, ifChairman Levitt speaks for the SEC. He has
called selective disclosure a "stain on our market" Arthur Levitt, Jr., Quality
Information: The Lifeblood of Our Markets, Remarks atthe Economic Club of New York
(Oct. 18, 1999), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/l1999/spch304.htm
(last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
84. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 240, 243, & 249).
85. See infra notes 95-143 and accompanying text.
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market~.' Citing a recent study, the SEC also has rejected the supposition that
selective disclosure is beneficial to the market' 7
Furthermore, the SEC considers the need for selective disclosure to have
vanished with today's array of available disclosure methods.'
Selective
disclosure, thus, is no longer a legitimate method of communicating with
investors.'
Lastly, the SEC views selective disclosure as an improper mediun of
exchange: issuer information for analysts' favor or deference.'2 Such a quid pro
quo approach to selective disclosure encourages biased analyses of companies,"'
refutes the practice's supposed benefits, and, hence, turns information into
disinformation.9

86. FinalRule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716. InneitherRegulationFDnortheProposing
Release does the SEC offer empirical evidence to showa reduction in investor confidence
fromthe practice ofselective disclosure oranyharmto themarkets fromsuch a reduction.
Instead, the SEC offers the investor response in the form of the six-thousand comment
letters it received after the SEC invited comment on Regulation FD in the Proposing
Release; virtually all ofthe letters supportedthe rule. FinalRule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,717.
This is an example of the public misjudging systemic benefits of the securities and
information market, which leads to "actual harm resulting from policies designed to
'correct' perceived problems." SOwELL, supranote 23, at 69.
87. Proposing Release, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,592 (proposed Dec. 28, 1999).
After presumptively declaring the "legitima[cy]" of some analysts' efforts in bringing
information to the market the SEC referred to Richard Frankel et al, An Empirical
ExaminationofConference Calls as a VoluntaryDisclosureMedium, 37 J. Acct.REs.
133 (1999). Proposing Release, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,592. In that study, researchers
examined the nature of firms using conference calls and the quality of the information
disclosed. Frankel et al.,
supra, at 133-35. The study showed that firms that use
conference calls tend to be larger and that material information is, in fact, disclosed
during these calls. Frankel et al, supra,at 149-50. Moreover, the evidence indicated the
issuer's trading volume increased during the period of the conference call Frankel etal,
supra,at 149-50. The article provocatively ends: "Unless all stockholders are provided
equal access to these calls, this conduct seems inconsistentwiththe SEC's espoused goal
of providing a 'level playing field' with regard to corporate disclosures." Frankel et al.,
supra,at 150.
88. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,717. Such methods include the Intemet-based
webcasting and teleconferencing of meetings, company web sites, and question-andanswer sessions with analysts. See Lynn Cowan, Internet Broadcastof Conference
Calls CreatesBuzz andNichefor Businesses, WALL ST. J.,
May 24, 1999, at B9.
89. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,717.
90. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716-17; see also Laderman, supranote 63
(reporting onthe pressures on analysts to exaggeratepositivereports of some companies).
91. See Langevoort, supranote 25, at 1040-42.
92. As to those benefits, see supranotes 52-83 and accompanying text
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To the SEC, selective disclosure resembles its ill-favored brother, insider
trading. Yet, although they both emerged from the same family of laws, one has
been defended incrementally by the case law, the other suppressed.' Nonetheless,
the SEC's desire to limit selective disclosure94 has led to its persistent litigation in
this area.
Chiefly, the SEC has attempted to deter selective disclosure by using 1Ob-5
liability. 5 The past thirty years of case law, however, has diminished the threat
lOb-5 poses to analysts conducting legitimate activities, i.e., receiving information
without any breach of a fiduciary duty. Increasingly, analysts have found a safe
harbor inthe development of 1Ob-5 liability. In response, the SEC has adapted its
theories in a continual effort to target selective disclosure.
In re InvestorsManagement Co.9" was an early case in which the SEC used
a parity of information theory of fraud to find liability for selective disclosure.'

93. Nonetheless, there is much support for a relaxation of the prohibition of insider
trading. For one of the first proponents of this argument, see generally H. MANN,
INsiIER TRADiNG AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R.
Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 895 (1984)
(suggesting that the "allocation of the valuable property right in information would be
better left to private negotiations and common law development" rather than federal
regulation); David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A CoasianModel of Insider
Trading,80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1449, 1467 (1986) (concluding some rational shareholders
would allow corporate insiders to trade on inside information). But see Saul Levmore,
In Defense ofthe Regulation ofInsiderTrading, 11 HARv. J.L. &PuB. PoL'Y 101 (1988)
(arguing that unregulated insider trading can decrease the informational level). For a
modem comparison of the arguments, pro and con, see BAMNRIDGE, supra note 16, at
125-63.
94. Commissioner Edward H. Fleischman, Ferreting in the Interstices of S.E.C.
Attitudes to Securities Analysts, Speech Presented to the Eighteenth Annual Securities
Regulation Institute, University of California, San Diego (Jan. 24, 1991), in PRENTICE
HALL L. & Bus. INsIGHTs, July 1991, at 2.
95. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Exchange Act gives "authority to the SEC to prohibit
'any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance"' in the selling or purchasing of
stocks. BAINBIU-E, supranote 16, at 25 (quoting Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §
10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994)). Rule lOb-5 allows the SEC to sue those who have
used fraud or made material misstatements or omissions in connection with the
purchasing or selling of a stock. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 29; see 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (2000).
96. No. 3-1680, 1971 WL 11262 (SEC Jul. 29, 1971).
97. The parity ofinformation theory posits that all investors should have "relatively
equal access to material information" in order to achieve a fair and efficient marketplace.
Bruce A. Hiler, Dirks v. SEC-A Study in Cause andEffect, 43 MD. L. REv. 292, 297
n.27 (1984).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol66/iss4/8

18

Morgan: Morgan: Regulation FD:
2001]

REGULATIONFD

In the 1960s, an SEC examiner charged" investment advisors with violating or
aiding and abetting" violations of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,11 and §
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 ofthe Exchange Act."'1 InInvestorsManagementCo., the
advisors had received selectively-disclosed information from officials ofDouglas
Aircraft Co., a commercial airlineproducer. 1' Because the advisors knew thatthe
information was nonpublic and material, that it had been acquired "improperly by
selective revelation," and that the information induced their transactions," the
defendants had violated the antifraud prohibitions.",
The SEC has not stopped with holding analysts liable but, instead, has
attacked the problem from both ends. In deterring selective disclosure, the SEC
historically has pursued lOb-5 actions against disclosing companies and their

98. Section2l of the 1934 Exchange Act generously empowers the SEC to launch
investigations and bring actions against "any person [who] has violated, is violating, or
is about to violate any provision of [the Exchange Act]." Securities Exchange Act of
1934 §21a(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(1) (1994); see alsoRalph C. Ferrara &DavidNerkle,
Overview of an S.E.C. EnforcementAction, 8 CoRP. L. REv. 306 (1985) (providing a
practical guide for corporate attorneys responding to an enforcement action). For a
critique and suggestions for reform, see William R. McLucas et al, An Oerview of
Various ProceduralConsiderationsAssociated ith the Securities and Exchange
Commission'sInvestigative Process,45 Bus. LAW. 625 (1990).
99. Though the Supreme Court has established that a private plaintiff may not
recover damages for aiding and abetting § lOb-5 violations, the SEC's ability to bring
enforcement actions for aiding and abetting has been assured by the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which added § 20(o to the Exchange Act. Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat 737 (1995);
Central Bank, N.A v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994); see also
Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, A New StandardforAiders andAbetiors
under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 52 BUs. LAw. 1 (1996)
(summarizing the legislative history of the law and its substance).
100. Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see
alsoAaronv. SEC, 446 U.S. 680,691 (1980) (holding that scientermustbe shownin an
actionbrought under § 17(a)(1), butnot § 17(a)(2) or § 17(a)(3), in order to accord with
congressional intent).
101. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2000).
102. In re Investors Management Co., No. 3-1680, 1971 WL 11262, at *3 (SEC
Jul 29, 1971).
103. Based on the information, the investment advisors subsequently sold their
shares of Douglas Aircraft. Id. at *3. In addition, they recommended to brokers, fund
managers, andthose expressing interestinthe stock that anyholdings inDouglas Aircraft
be sold. Id.
104. Id. at *9.
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agents. For instance, in SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,"° the SEC attempted to
impose liability on the company and one of its executives on the theory of tipping
securities analysts."M The SEC claimed an official had violated § lOb and Rule
1Ob-5 of the Exchange Act by selectively disclosing to analysts." The United
States District Court for the District of New York denied the SEC the relief it
sought."'8 Because the court found that the official did not trade any information
for his own benefit, he consequently lacked the required mental state.'
Moreover, the SEC's request for injunctive relief was inappropriate given the
improbability of future violations by the defendants."' Although the SEC

105. 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977). In this
case, the SEC also sought injunctions against the securities analysts who received the
information, but those analysts consented to the judgments before the trial. SEC v.
Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 14 n.14 (2d Cir. 1977).
106. Liability for tipping is a variant of lOb-5 liability. It involves an insider who
does nottrade onthe basis of inside informationhimself orherself butrather "tips" others
to that information who then trade on that information. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., No.
8-3925, 1961 WL 3743, at *4 (SEC Nov. 8, 1961); see also BAINBRIDGE, supranote 16,
at 41-42 (discussing Cady and tipping liability).
107. The interviews consisted mostly of the analysts seeking commentary on their
earnings estimates for the company, their recommendations, and Bausch & Lomb's plans
to adapt to recent reversals. Bausch & Lomb, 565 F.2d at 11-12. One of the analyst's
ensuing recommendations and earnings revision was interpreted by "the Wall Street
grapevine" as an actual Bausch & Lomb release of a similarly depressed earnings
estimate. Id. at 13.
108. Bausch & Lomb, 420 F. Supp. at 1246. The SEC sought injunctive relief
against Bausch & Lomb under § 21 of the Exchange Act. See Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 2 1(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see also I HAZEN, supra
note 6, § 9.5, at 399-401 (discussing SEC injunctions).
109. Bausch &Lomb, 420 F. Supp. at 1242. To prove a violation under Rule lOb-5
of the Exchange Act, it must be shown that the defendant acted with scienter,or an intent
to deceive or defraud. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2000); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 211 (1976). Moreover, scienter must be shown in either aprivate action under
Rule lob-5 or an SEC enforcement action. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980).
Subsequent courts have incorporated the common law conjoining of recklessness and
scienter in order to satisfy the fraud requirement of Rule lOb-5 actions. See Sanders v.
John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1005
(1981). For further discussion and details of the recklessness standard as it pertains to
Rule lOb-5, see also 2 HAZEN, supra note 16, § 13.4, at 80-86 (elaborating onthe lob-5
scienter element and its district variations); Allan Horwich, The NeglectedRelationship
ofMaterialif andRecklessness inActions UnderRule 10b-5,55 Bus. LAW. 1023,102324 (2000) (asking whether an actor should be held to a recklessness standard when he or
she negligently concludes that the fact he or she has omitted is actually material).
110. Bausch & Lomb, 420 F. Supp. at 1243. The SEC must show that there is a
reasonable likelihoodthatthe previous infractionwill be repeated. SEC v. Pros Int'l, Inc.,
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appealed to the Second Circuit, the appellate court affirmed the lower court's
111
ruling.
Bausch & Lomb was the beginning of setbacks for the SEC in fighting
selective disclosure. Innuancing the duty of disclosure in 1980, the United States
Supreme Court began a trend that would ease restraints on selective disclosure.
In Chiarellav. UnitedStates,"2 the Court held that mere possession of material,
nonpublic information does notgiveriseto a duty of disclosureunder §10(b) ofthe
1934 Securities Exchange Act.1 Rather, a duty to disclose exists when a party
(such as a corporate insider) owes a fiduciary duty to another (i.e., a shareholder)
and possesses material information."' Moreover, a tippee assumes, in effect, not
only information from the insider but also inherits a duty to disclose or abstain
from trading: he or she becomes a "participant after the face' to the insider's
breach of his or her fiduciary duty." 5
Subsequently, Dirks v. SEC"6 not only built upon the liability scheme but
also protected issuers' continued use of selective disclosure to securities analysts.
In 1973, Raymond Dirks, a securities analyst, learned from a former official about

994 F.2d 767, 769 (10th Cir. 1993). The probability is judged by the "totality of the
circumstances." SEC v. Mgmt Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 807 (2d Cir. 1975).
111. Bausch& Lomb, 565 F.2dat 19. Writing for the court, ChiefJudge Irving R.
Kaufinan authoredthevivid metaphor comparing the relationship between an analyst and
a corporate executiveto a "fencing match conducted onatightrope" whereinthe executive
must"parry... incisive questioning." Id.at 9. This is picturesque language to be sure,
but it is no longer apt; the relationship between an executive and an analyst is scarcely so
hostile anymorenorwouldthe executive attempt to block the questions. See supranotes
40-67 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, ChiefJudge Kaufinan's analogicaltropehas
become standard in discussions of analyst-executive interactions. See, e.g., J. Scott

Colesanti, Bouncing the Tightrope: The S.LC. Attacks Selective Disclosure, But
ProvidesLittle StabilityforAnalysts, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1 (2000); Commissioner Laura
S.Unger, Fallout from RegulationFD: Has the SEC Finally Cut the Tightrope?, Speech
at the GlasserLegalWorks Conference on SEC RegulationFD (Oct. 27,2000), available
at http:/www.sec.gov/news/speechspch421.htm (last modified Nov. 13, 2000).
For a discussion and critique ofjudicial opinions as a literary source, see RICHARD
A. POSNER, LAw AND L=LRATURE 253-302 (1998).
112. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
113. Id. at 235.
114. Id. at 228. In the insider trading context, a fiduciary duty prohibits the agent
from using information that he or she gained because of his or her position within a
corporation forhis orherpersonal benefit Id.at 240; see also United States v. O'Hagan,
521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997) (affming the misappropriation theory of insider trading);
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 94-112 (summarizing the development of the
misappropriation theory).

115. Chiarella,445 U.S. at 230.
116. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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fraud occurring at Equity Funding of America." 7 Mr. Dirks attempted to verify
the claims and inform the public, going so far as to notify the press, to no avail."'
During this process, Mr. Dirks was open about his information, and those with
whomhe communicatedbeganto sell their holdings inEquity Funding." 9 Because
Mr. Dirks's efforts led to a significant price drop in Equity Funding, the fraud was
eventually exposed. 2 ' However, the SEC accused Mr. Dirks of violating the
securities laws by refusing either to disclose the information publicly or refrain
from trading.' Mr. Dirks's "extensive investigative efforts"'' and attempts at
disclosure to the world's leading financial newspaper inthe face of others' inaction
to the allegations2 ameliorated his violation; thus, the SEC merely censured
24

hiM 1

The Supreme Court overturned Mr. Dirks's censure. 2" In so holding, the
Court rejected the SEC's supposition that the antifraud provisions of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act demanded informational equality in the marketplace.12 6
117. Id. at 648-49. Ronald Secrist, an erstwhile officer of Equity Funding of
America, tipped Mr. Dirks to the fraudulently exaggerated assets of the corporation so
that Mr. Dirks would investigate the claims and reveal the fraud publicly. Id. at 649.
This was not the first intimation of fraud at Equity Funding. Id. at 650 n,3. The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia noted that the SEC "repeatedly
missed opportunities" to bring to a halt the fraud at Equity Funding. Dirks v. SEC, 681
F.2d 824, 829 (1982), rev'd,463 U.S. 646 (1983).
118. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 649. Mr. Dirks interviewed Equity Funding officials and
employees at the corporation's headquarters in Los Angeles. Id. Mr. Dirks also
contacted the Wall Street Journal'sLos Angeles Buteau Chief William Bundell who
declined to report the story, fearing a libel action. Id. at 649-50.
119. Id.
at 649. Neither Mr. Dirks nor his firm traded or owned any holdings in
Equity Funding, but clients and other investors with whom Mr. Dirks spoke sold their
shares. Id.This included five investment advisors who sold more than $16 million in
Equity Funding stock. Id.
120. California insurance authorities seized EquityFunding's records, and the SEC
filed a complaint against the corporation. Id. at 650. Equity Funding went into
receivership, and twenty-two of its officials were convicted or pled guilty in subsequent
trials. Id.
at 650 r.4.
121. Id. at 650-51. Specifically, Mr. Dirks violated § 17(a) of the Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77q(a) (1994), and § 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). He also violated Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.lOb-5 (2000).
122. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 652 n.8.
123. See supra note 118.

124. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 651-52. It was Mr. Dirks's attempts to inform and the
SEC's response that have made his story de rigueurin any discussion of insider trading
and analysts, if only for the shock value.
125. See id.
at667.
126. See id.
at 657.
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Instead, the Court noted that vigorous markets are predicated upon securities
analysts." To require that one must electbetween disclosure or trading abstention
uponreceipt of material, nonpublic information-the grist of the security analyst's
mill-would have an "inhibiting influence on... analysts."'
Moreover, the Court accommodated selective disclosure by refining the
analysis begun in Chiarella. 9 According to the Court, for there to be a breach
that would threaten the tippee with derivative liability under the securities laws,
the insider must have disclosed in order to benefit personally, either directly or
0
indirectly.1
In Mr. Dirks's case, he was a "stranger to Equity Funding, with no
preexisting fiduciary duty.""' He was entrusted with the information so that he
could expose the fraud."' Neilher a fiduciary nor improperly tipped, then, Mr.
Dirks was notbound to disclose or refrain from trading---no duty, no violation,
no censure.
Eight years later, in SEC v. Stevens," the SEC latched onto the required
"personal gain'1 35 of Dirks to find liability in a case of selective disclosure to

127. See id.at 658; see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234 (1980)
(making a similar exception, based on congressional intent, for market specialists who
"contribute to a fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they exploit the
informational advantage that comes from their possession of buy and sell orders").
128. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658.
129. See supranotes 112-15 and accompanying text.
130. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662. The Court went on to admit that determining when
an insider benefits fromiimproper disclosuremaybe difficult in some cases, but"objective
facts and circumstances" will guide the determination. Id.at 664. Where the insider's
disclosure is part of a quid pro quo or is intended as a gift for the tippee, a personal
benefit occurs and liability ensues. Id. The benefit received is not to be defined too
narrowly. it can consist of the outright cash value, reputational standing, or even
exchanged information. Id. at 663. The Court quoted Professor Victor Brudney: "'The
theory... is that the insider, by giving the information out selectively, is in effect selling
the information to its recipients for cash, reciprocal information, or other things of value
for himself." Id. at 663-64 (quoting Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and
InformationalAdvantagesUnder the FederalSecurities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322,
348 (1979)).
131. Id.at 665. OnDirks and its conception of fiduciary duties, see also DanielR.
Fischel, Insider Trading andInvesfnentAnalysts: An EconomicAnalysis of Dirks v.
Securities Exchange Commission, 13 HoFsr AL. REv. 127, 127-40 (1984).
132. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 649.
133. Id. at 664-65.
134. No. 12813, 1991 WL 296537 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1991).
135. Dirks,463 U.S. at 662.
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analysts.'3 6 The SEC filed a complaint 1 " against Phillip J. Stevens, the founder
and chief executive officer of Ultrasystems Corporation,' for correcting
disclosures that hehadmade to analysts before making a public disclosure of those
same corrections.139 The SEC asserted that Mr. Stevens made the disclosures
because, in 1984, an analyst following the American Stock Exchange-traded
corporationpublicly confronted Mr. Stevens about his portrayal ofUltrasystems's
financial numbers after a surprisingly negative earnings release. 4 According to
the SEC, Mr. Stevens's professional standing and earning ability were threatened
by this challenge. 141 Therefore, he reaped an improper Dirks benefit from the
disclosure of material, nonpublic information. 142 Rather than contest the
enforcement action, Mr. Stevens acceded to an immediate consent decree at the
same time that the SEC filed the complaint. 143

Thus, a backward glance across the legal landscape of the twentieth century
reveals that an issuer has no duty to reveal material information solely because it

136. Stevens, 1991 WL 296537, at *1.
137. The SEC soughtto enjoin the now-retired chief executive officer from violating
any further federal securities laws and to disgorge $126,455,200, the amount
analyst-informed investors avoided losing in Stevens's former company. Under § 8A of
the 1933 Act and § 21C of the 1934 Exchange Act, the SEC has the authority to seek a
cease-and-desist order against any party who has, is currently, or is preparing to violate
any federal security law. Securities Act of 1933 § 8A, 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1 (1994);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21C, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (1994). Also, "[i]n any ceaseand-desist proceeding.., the [SEC] may enter an order requiring accounting and
disgorgement, includingreasonable interest." Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21C(e),
15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(e) (1994). See generally 1HAZENsupranote6, § 3.6-.7, at 110-20;
Larry S. Gondelman & Thais R. Rencher, What the SEC Won't Tell You About Ceaseand-Desist Orders, 28 SEC. REG. L.J. 163 (2000) (highlighting the administrative
discrepancies in issuing such orders).
138. Coffee, SEC, supra note 55.
139. Coffee, SEC, supra note 55.
140. Stevens, 1991 WL 296537, at *2.
141. "Stevens perceived this challenge as injurious to his professional reputation
and as placing in jeopardy his continued earnings power as a chief executive and a
manager." Id. at *1.
142. Id. For a discussion ofDirks, seesupranotes116-33 and accompanying text.
Given the Court's dicta in Dirks regarding the importance of analysts, it is unlikely that
the Supreme Court meant for the personal benefit that is a metric of improper disclosure
to stretch so broadly. See supranotes 127-28 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, this
type of personal benefit-the trading of material, nonpublic information for analyst
favor-would become the impetus for Regulation FD. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716,
51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, & 249). For a detail
of this alleged practice in the corporate world, see also Laderman, supranote 63.
143. Stevens, 1991 WL 296537, at *2.
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is material An issuer does not violate the securities laws when its officers
disclose material, nonpublic information to individual parties if such disclosure
does not violate an independent fiduciary duty and no personal benefit accrues to
the insider. An unchallenged theory of personal benefit however, stands poised
to open the door to liability in all selective disclosures to analysts.'" Yet,rather
thanpursuethis avenue, the SEC insteadwouldrelyuponits rule-making authority
to reduce the incidence of selective disclosure in the future.

Ifi. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Rather than as an antifraud rule,"' the SEC announced Regulation FD as an
issuer disclosure rule under its authority embedded in § 13(a) and § 15(d) of the
1934 Exchange Act.'46 To begin, the core of Regulation FD,Rule 100, is stated
in its finalized entirety. A more detailed examination of its elements follows,
including those antecedents to any duties of which corporate counsel now mustbe
aware. Finally, a summary of the duties is provided.
Rule 100 is the general rule of Regulation FD,and states that:

144. Coffee, SEC, supranote55. Professor Coffee suggests this theory ofpersonal
benefit "trivializes Dirks" and criticizes the theory on several grounds. Coffee, SEC,
supranote 55. First, it is in the shareholders' interest for the chief executive officer to
specify numbers given to analysts when projections have gone astray, this increases the

company's credibility with analysts. Coffee, SEC, supranote 55. The benefit to the
corporation, then, is the benefit to the shareholders. Coffee, SEC, supra note 55.
Secondly, as chief executive officer, chairman of the board, and substantial stockholder
of Ultrasystems, whatever benefit Mr. Stevens received was incidental to the benefit that
also accrued to the shareholders. Coffee, SEC, supra note 55. Lastly, as a smaller
company, Ultrasystems had a legitimate interest in maintaining credibility with analysts
who tracked the stock but received erroneous information. Coffee, SEC,supranote 55.
145. Because Regulation FD was not announced as an anti-fraud rule, the SEC
was able to avoid "insider trading issues." Proposing Release, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590,

72,594 (proposed Dec. 28, 1999).
146. Proposing Release, 64 Fed. Reg. at72,594. The SEC also notes that couching
Regulation FD as a disclosure rule is more consistent with the regulation being used as
a means toward full and fair disclosure. Proposing Release, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,594.
On the same day it adopted Regulation FD,the SEC adopted Rule lObS-1, a new
rule relating to insider trading implications of a trader's "use" or "knowing possession"
of material, nonpublic information. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,737. Also, the SEC
released Rule 10b5-2, which announces underwhat circumstances themisappropriation
theory of insider trading is applied to familial or other non-business relationships. Final
Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,738. This Law Summary does not consider either of these
additional rules.
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(a) Whenever an issuer, or person acting on its behalf, discloses
anymaterialnonpublic informationregarding that issuer orits securities
to any person described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, the issuer
shall make public disclosure of that information as provided in §
243.101 (e):
(1) Simultaneously, in the case of an intentional disclosure; and
(2) Promptly, in the case of a nonintentional disclosure. 47
A. Antecedents to Duties Under Regulation FD
1. Issuers and Recipients Subject to and Excluded from Regulation FD
Regulation FD blankets many issuers: all issuers that are registered under §
12 of the 1934 Exchange Act, as well as all issuers that must file reports under §
15(d) of the 1934 Exchange Act, are subject to Regulation FD. 48 Further,
disclosures by "any person acting on behalf of the issuer" are also covered.'49
Rule 100(b)(1) lists the four categories of information recipients subject to
Regulation FD. The four categories are:
(i)... a broker or dealer, or a person associated with abroker or dealer,
...(ii)... an investment adviser;... (i)... an investment company
... or [its] affiliated person;... or (iv)... a holder of the issuer's
securities, under circumstances in which itis reasonably foreseeable that
the person will purchase or sell the issuer's securities on the basis of the
50
information.'
The SEC's goal in constructing this scheme was to streamline Regulation FD
so as only to apply to individuals most likely to receive selectively-disclosed
information.'5 Thus, Regulation FD does not extend to communications with
other businesses, the government, or the media.'52

147. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,738.
148. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,724. The SEC expects that Regulation FD will
affect thirteen-thousand issuers. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,731-32.
149. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,738. Suchpersons include "any senior official

of the issuer ... or any other officer, employee, or agent of an issuer who regularly
communicates with [securities professionals] or withholders of the issuer's securities."
FinalRule, 65 Fed. Reg. at5l,739. Rule 101 (d)defines "senior official" as "any director,
executive officer,... investorrelations or public relations or any other person with similar
function." Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,739.
150. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,738.

151. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,719.
152. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720.
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Rule 100(b)(2) of Regulation FD also contains four exclusions, generally
classified as exempt recipients except for the last category. The first two
exclusions apply to: (1) disclosures to those who are obligated by a "duty oftrust
or confidence to the issuer," ' and (2) those who expressly agree to keep the
selectively-disclosed information confidential." The third exemption applies to
credit rating services, so long as the selectively-disclosed information is used for
such purposes and the ratings are made public. 5 The fourth exemption applies
to a type of selective disclosure rather than the recipient With some exceptions,
Regulation FD does not apply to disclosures that are made in connection with a
public offering of a security registered under the Securities Act.'
2. Material, Nonpublic Information
Regulation FD pertains onlyto informational disclosures that aremateial and
nonpublic." 7 When examining potential disclosures, corporate counsel may rely
upon antecedent definitions of"material"' s and "nonpublieU 9 developed by case
law." The SEC enumerated an admittedly incomplete list of items that should be
carefully considered as possibly material:

153. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,738.
154. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720. Regulation FD need not apply to these
individuals because liability could be found under eithertheir status as temporary insiders
or the misappropriation theory of insider trading.
155. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,738. This exception was a change from the
proposed regulation and was prompted by the comments the SEC received. Final Rule,
65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720.
156. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,738. Regulation FD does not provide an
exception for unregistered offerings. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,725.
157. FinalRule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721.
158. For the definition of materiality, see supra note 6. The SEC suggested ways
to ease the burden ofreal-time materialityjudgments: (1)funnel informationrequests to
authorized spokespersons; (2) keep records ofprivate communications with those subject
to the regulation (perhaps by adding a third person to the conversations, or recording
them); (3)postpone answers to questions that might implicate the regulation until its
materiality can be ascertained; (4) alternatively answer the question, but secure the
questioner's confidentiality and abstention from acting uponit until, again, the answer's
materialityis diseemedandpublicly disclosedifnecessar, or(5) employthe regulation's
device for unintentional disclosures whenneeded. See Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at51721
n.44 .

159. Information is nonpublic if it has yet to be distributed in such a manner so as
to make it generally known to investors. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721.
160. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721.
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(1) [e]arnings information; (2) mergers, acquisitions, tender offers,joint
ventures, or changes in assets; (3) new products or discoveries, or
developments regarding customers or suppliers (e.g., the acquisition or
loss of a contract); (4) changes in control or in management; (5) change
in auditors or auditor notification that the issuer may no longer rely on
an auditor's audit report; (6) events regarding the issuer's
securities-e.g., defaults on senior securities, calls of securities for
redemption, repurchase plans, stock splits or changes in dividends,
changes to the rights of security holders, public or private sales of
additional securities; and (7) bankruptcies or receiverships.'
Corporate counsel should be especially alert to any guidance from analysts
regarding earnings data." Where the issuer's agent confirms or refutes-either
directly or indirectly-the analyst's projections, that agent probably has subjected
the issuer to liability under Regulation FD. On the other hand, an analyst's own
insight as to some information will not make otherwise immaterial information
material; thus, an agent's disclosure of that specific information to the analyst will
not involve Regulation FD.' M
Lastly, the agent's awareness regarding the particular disclosure is critical.
The SEC agreed with commentators that the materiality requirement is part of the
analysis of one's intention for purposes of required, subsequent public
disclosure.'65 Thus, Rule 101(a) states that a party selectively discloses
intentionally only if he or she knows, or is reckless in not knowing, that the
information is material and nonpublic. "
3. Intentional and Non-intentional Disclosures
Under Regulation 1D, the intent behind the selective disclosure is an
operative fact. If the selective disclosure is intentional, then an issuer has a duty

161. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721. The SEC notes that this list is not to be
interpreted as an exhaustive menu ofperse material items. See Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg.
at 51,721.
162. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721.
163. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721. For liability under Regulation FD, see
infra notes 191-96 and accompanying text.
164. FinalRule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,722. In fact, the SEC notes that Regulation FD
is not designed to inhibit this sort of valuable fact-finding-the inference of a material
conclusion from apparently immaterial premises. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,722.
165. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,722.
166. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,738. For more on the intentional and nonintentional distinction, see infra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
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to make a simultaneous public disclosure;"6 if it is unintentional, then, the duty
requires a prompt public disclosure."6
Rule 101(a) of Regulation FD states that an issuer intentionally makes a
selective disclosure when the issuer or person acting on behalf of the issuer
"making the disclosure either knows, or is reckless in not knowing, [prior to
making the disclosure,] that the information he or she is communicating is both
material and nonpublic."' 69 Thus, given the way federal courts are currently
interpreting recklessness, the SEC has noted that an issuer's good faith effort to
stay within the bounds of Regulation FD probably would not be considered
reckless. 70
Regulation FD provides a safe harbor in cases where the disclosure is nonintentional.'
If a spokesperson selectively discloses due to a misunderstanding
about the information's materiality, liability ensues onlyif "no reasonable person
under the circumstances would have made the same determination?"'

B. Duties UnderRegulation FD
In keeping with precedent, Regulation FD does not mandate the release of
information because it is material or nonpublic. Instead, to avoid liability under
Regulation FD, an issuer cannot disclose intentionally material, nonpublic
information without also making a simultaneous public disclosure.'
For
non-intentional selective disclosures, however, the issuer must make a prompt
public disclosure." This subsection explores the duties of public and prompt
disclosure required by Regulation FD.

167. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,738. The SEC does not define
"simultaneously" for purposes of Regulation FD.
168. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,738. The nature of the prompt and public
disclosure is explored infra in notes 175-90 and accompanying text
169. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,738. This definition of "intentional" was
considered most apt because it shares the mental state required to show fraud in other
actions. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,722. For a discussion regarding the mental state
of scienter, see supranote 109.
170. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,722. As examples, the SEC cites toHollinger
v. TitanCapitalCorp., 914 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.denied,499 U.S. 976 (1991),
and SundstrandCorp.v. Sun ChemicalCorp., 553 F.2d 1033,1045 (7thCir. 1977), cert.
denied,434 U.S. 875 (1977).
171. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,722; see also Robert J. Conner, Regulaition
[sic] FD: Its Creation,Its Authority. Its PossibleImpact, 28 SEc. REG. L.J. 233, 267
(2000) (describing the unintentional disclosure element as "temporary safe harbor").
172. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,722.
173. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,738.
174. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,738.
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1. The Duty of Public Disclosure
Rule 101(e) defines the necessary public disclosure under Regulation FD. 75
An issuer can satisfy the public disclosure requirement in one of two ways: (1)
filing a Form 8-K,"76 or (2) otherwise disclosing in a manner that is "reasonably
designed to provide broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information to the
77

public.

1

Due to the comments it received, the SEC modified the first option of Form
8-K filing. 7 First, the SEC stipulated that an issuer is not deemed to have made
any assertions regarding the information's materialityjust because the information

was submitted on a Form 8-K.

79 Secondly,

corporate counsel can comply with

Regulation FD by filing a Form 8-K Item 5 report of the information,8 0 or
furnishinga report of the same information under Item 9 of Form 8-K.1"'
Under the second option provided by Rule 101 (e)(2), issuers have the choice
of how to satisfy the public disclosure requirements. Counsel must achieve a
"broad, non-exclusionary distribution" method given the issuer's options and
station in the market." This is an issuer-specific inquiry.1" To the extent the
SEC must make that evaluation expost, it reviews the entire constellation of facts
and circumstances facing the issuer at the time of the decision on how to

disclose.'"

175. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,739.

176. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,739. "SEC Rule 13a-11 requires the filing of
current reports within 15 days of specified material changes in the issuer's financial
condition or method of operations. Form 8-K is the appropriate form for these reports."
1 HAZPN, supranote 6, § 9.3, at 522 (citations omitted).
177. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,739.
178. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723.
179. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,738.
180. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,738. In so doing, the issuer becomes subject
to liability under § 11 and § 12(a)(2) ofthe Securities Act, and § 18 ofthe Exchange Act.
Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723.
181. The SEC makes a point to distinguish filed from funished information in the
Final Rule. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723. Furnishedinformation, as opposed to
filed information, will not expose the issuer to liability under § 11 of the Securities Act
or § 18 of the Exchange Act. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723.
182. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,724.
183. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,724. Thus, Company A's large investor
following maypermit itto satisfactorily disclose byposting onthe web as part of an array
of disclosure methods, but Company B, with its more modest market retinue, may have
to choose a number of additional methods to achieve public disclosure.
184. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,724.
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To highlight the SEC's expected level-but not necessarily method-of
public disclosure, the finalized release offers a recommended tripartite model to
issuers for satisfactory disclosure."a First, the issuer can issue a press release to
the "regular channels." 1" The issuer then can give sufficient notice of a scheduled
conference call for purposes of discussing the release." Finally, the issuer should
convene the conference call "in an open nanner."'8

2. The Duty of Prompt Disclosure
Under Rule 100(a)(2), where a selective disclosure is non-intentional, an
issuer has a duty to make a public disclosure of the same information in a prompt
manner."s Corporate counsel should be aware that the senior official is the
catalyst to a duty of prompt disclosure because Regulation FD defines promptly

in relation to a senior official. For purposes of the regulation, "promptly" means:
[A]s soon as reasonablypracticable (but inno event after the later of24
hours or the commencement of the next day's trading on the New York

Stock Exchange) after a senior official of the issuer (or, in the case of

185. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,274.
186. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,724. Although the SEC does not elaborate as
to whatthose "regular channels" are in the Final Rule, inthe Proposing Release, the SEC
referred to Reuters, PR Newswire, Business Wire, Bloomberg, and Dow Jones.
Proposing Release, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590,72,596 (proposed Dec. 28, 1999). Therelease
should describe the information to be disclosed (or previously disclosed if done
unintentionally).

187. FinalRule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,724. To effectnotice, the SEC suggests a press
release orposting onthe issuer's web site giving details as to the time and date of the call,
and as to the ways the individual investors can access the call. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg.
at 51,724.
188. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,724. "Open manner" does not mean that
investors have the option of asking questions during the call. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg.
at 51,724 n-71. To allow further access, the SEC recommends that issuers using
conference calls or webeasts as part of their disclosure ought to consider making the
recorded call or conference available for a "reasonable period of time" to those who
missed it Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,724 n.73.
The SEC expects the cost of the required 8-K submissions will range from
$34,937,500 to $49,562,500 peryear. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,732. This implies
that the SEC thinks the loss of investor confidence and other consequences of selective
disclosure exceed approximately $35 to $50 million per year, although the SEC has not
quantified that loss. Conspicuously, the SEC does not offer any suggestions as to any
possible offsetting benefits of selective disclosure. Measuring such costs, however,
admittedly would be difficult
189. FinalRule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,738.
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a closed-end investment company, a senior official of the issuer's
investment adviser) learns that there has been a non-intentional
disclosure by the issuer or person acting on behalf of the issuer of
information that the senior official knows, oris reckless innotknowing,
is both material and nonpublic. "0

C. Liability UnderRegulation FD
If an issuer or someone acting on behalf ofthe issuer violates Regulation FD,
and a safe harbor is not available, Regulation FD provides for issuer (and possible
individual) liability. The SEC responds to violations of Regulation FD with the
same array of options that it brings to bear against other infractions of issuer
disclosure rules.
First, the SEC can bring an enforcement action against an issuer for violating
its duties under § 13(a) and § 15(d) of the Exchange Act.19' Alternatively, the
SEC could bring a similar action against an individual or an administrative action
against the issuer."
However, Rule 102 of Regulation FD specificallyprovides that anissuer does
not violate Rule lob-5 when it fails to make a required disclosure under the
regulation-' Because the regulation is not intended to supplement duties under
Rule lOb-5, the issuer's counsel can find a safe harbor from private lob-5
actions. 194

The SEC cautions, however, that Rule 102 will provide no protection against
violations that implicate other rules in addition to Regulation FD.S Corporate
counsel for the issuer still must be attuned to apparent instances of Dirks's
"personal benefit" inducing a selective disclosure; failing to update material

190. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,739. The SEC helpfully illustrates howthe rule
works by hypothesizing that if a senior official discovers the improper disclosure on
Friday after market close, there must be a public disclosure by the opening of trading as

of the following Monday. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723. For the definition of
"senior official" for purposes of Regulation FD, see supra note 149.
191. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726. For information on the SEC's
enforcement action, see supranote 98.
192. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726. Where an individual's actions cause
cease-and-desist proceedings under § 21C of the Exchange Act, the SEC also can bring
an enforcement action against that individual. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §
21C, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (1994). Further, as the SEC observes, with administrative
actions against an issuer come the possibility of cease-and-desist orders, injunction
orders, and money penalties. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726.
193. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,739.
194. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726; Conner, supranote 171, at 269.
195. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726.
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information submitted under Regulation FD; submitting similar materials
containing false or misleading information; and the entanglement and adoption
theories of liability.196
IV. DIscussioN
Under its authority as information regulator, the SEC has promulgated a
disclosure rule to fight what it openly considers a practice aldn to insider
trading." The SEC could not reach issuer liability for selective disclosure using
thepersonalbenefit doctrine, so the SEC altered its strategy. Instead, the SEChas
categorized all disclosed information as requiring public disclosure. In other
words, the SEC did away with questions of a personal benefit or a breach of
fiduciary dutyin order to findthe heretofore elusive liability in selective disclosure
98

cases.1

As noted, the Supreme Court and other courts effectively have ensconced
selective disclosure.' Rule 10b-5 has proved a clumsy tool for defeating that
protection.l The SEC's task has been to stop selective disclosure within the
constraints of those decisions. Particularly troublesome was the Court's specific
rejection of any notion that Congress intended the antifraud rules to be aimed
toward the creation of parity of information."'
The SEC has nver tested the Stevens theory ofpersonalbenefit. Indeed, the
crucible of'judicial review likely would have revealed the theory of Stevens for
what it was-an unalloyed attempt to stretch Dirks'spersonal benefit to selective
disclosure inappropriately. The Courtreferred in dicta to the utility of analysts and
their searches. 2° Were the SEC's Stevens benefit to be used, it could apply so
widely thatit effectively would outlaw the very disclosures approvedby the Court.
As a result, the SEC hadto devise anew tactic. Nevertheless, RegulationFlD
does not meet the need. It is a cumbersome, blanket prohibition that trades one
form of "unfairness" for another and smothers a great deal of worthwhile activity.

196. FinalRule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726. Regarding the entanglement and adoption
theories, see supra note 47.
197. See Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716.
198. This regulatoryflexibilityis what according to Professor Seligman, has made
the SEC so successful-its willingness to applynumerous regulatorytoolsto aperceived
problem until a solution is found. See SEUIGAN, supranote 7, at 621.
199. See supranotes 112-33 and accompanying text.
200. "Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches
must be fraud." Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,234 (1980).

201. Id.at 223.
202. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658-59 (1983).
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A. Regulation FD Does Not Level the PlayingField
One of thejustifications for Regulation FD is that it levels the playing field." 0
However, some contours are deepened, while others obstinately remain. First,
Regulation FD subsidizes companies that more cheaply can make disclosures,
while it penalizes those companies that disclose at greater cost.2 °4 Though
Regulation FD requires an issuer to post sufficient notice of a disclosure, what is
sufficient varies from issuer to issuer." 5 Large companies, with greater
distribution channels, have every incentive to make public announcements: the
issuer maintains its share of advertising in the market and contributes to the
drowning out of those that disclose less.2" 6 The media will carry these disclosures,
and investors will follow them.2" However, because of their status in the market,
any disclosures from these companies would have been publicized heavily
anyway.
On the other hand, smaller companies with greater marginal disclosure costs
must be more selective with their disclosures. To the extent the suggested
disclosure of material, nonpublic information does not merit the required level of
announcement, the small issuer will not disclose the information if the cost of
public disclosure does not justify the expected benefit. Nevertheless, Regulation
FD denies the small issuer the option of selectively disclosing to analysts; as a
result the smaller issuer's capacity to add incrementally material information is
replaced by an all-or-nothing requirement. Indeed, smaller companies are held to
the same standards as the largest companies-despite their obvious differences. 2"

203. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, & 249).
204. See SowELL, supra note 23, at 232-37 (describing how administrative
agencies' regulations subsidize entire industries and penalize individual competitors not
incompliance).
205. See supranotes 55-57 and accompanying text.
206. Statistics show that, after Regulation FD was announced, the number of
earnings preannouncements increased fivefold. Jeff D. Opdyke, How Much are Stocks

Hurtingfrom Recent Rash of ProfitPreannouncementsTied to New Rule?, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 2, 2001, at C1 [hereinafter Opdyke, Stocks Hurting].
207. Thus, the level of information will rise on average as will the range of
materiality. The issuer, thus, passes the costs on to the investor who now must do more
research to reach an informed trading decision; must pay the cost of bidding improperly
based on misunderstanding data; or must incur the costs associated with decreased
attention to disclosures. Society also assumes the cost of imprudent investing as capital
is not allocated to its most productive sources.
208. "[The SEC does] not believe different performance standards for small entities
would be consistent with the purpose of Regulation FD." Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at
51,736.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol66/iss4/8

34

Morgan: Morgan: Regulation FD:

2001]

REGUL7TIONFD

With Regulation FD's further restrictions upon smaller issuers, fundamental
efficiency is decreased and capital formation is impeded."
Furthermore, itis questionable whether the individualis genuinely benefitted
byRegulationFD. Following an unintentional selective disclosure, the issuer has
twenty-fourhours fromthe time a senior official discovers the disclosure to correct
it Yet, those twenty-four hours are crucial: "larger investors trade in real time
onthebasis of information thatis released during conference calls."" This is not
to suggest, as others have,"' that the SEC was too generous in creating a safe

As to the differences between issuers, consider that smaller companies tend to rely
upon outside counsel more than larger companies-indicating their costs for counselassisted disclosure will be greater. Coffee, SEC, supranote 55. Smaller companies also
tend to avoid conference calls. Frankel et al.,
supra note 87, at 136. There is a positive
correlation between a firm's size and profitability, and the frequency withwhich it holds
conference calls. Frankel et al.,
supranote 87, at 136.
209. The SEC asserted that Regulation FD encourages capital formation because
it "enhanc[es] investor confidence andparticipation in the markets." Final Rule, 65 Fed.
Reg. at5l,734. This bolstered faithinthe markets, the SEC noted, will lead to increased
market efficiency and facilitate capital formation. Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,734.
This position is scarcely tenable. Judging from many of the letters, much of the investing
public was unaware of selective disclosure, so the practice did not affect its contribution
to the market; others apparentlymisunderstood the purpose ofRegulationFD. See, e.g.,
Letter from Michael A. Choate (Mar. 21, 2000), available at
http //www.see.govnues/proposed/s73 199/choatel.lxt (lastvisited Nov. 9,2001); Letter
from Kaiwen Lin (Mar.
21,
2000),
available at
htp'/www.see.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/linl.txt (lastvisited Nov. 9,2001);Letterfrom
Bonnie
Stroud
(Dec.
26,
1999),
available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/stroudl.txt (last visited Nov. 9,2001). That
others knew of selective disclosure but still invested shows that the practice did not
inhibit them
In short, RegulationFD does notprovide anyincentive to investthatwas previously
absent The regulation will not encourage people who were avoiding the stock market
suddenly to invest now that the days of selective disclosure are gone nor will it induce
others to double their investing efforts.
210. Frankel et al, supra note 87, at 135.
211. Robert Conner argued that investors would have benefitted more from
shortening the time a company's staff has to correct an inadvertent disclosure. See
Conner, supra note 171, at 276. With a shorter time period, argued Mr. Conner, an
issuer's officials would have a greater incentive to avoid such disclosures. Conner, supra
note 171, at 277. Nevertheless, the tradeoffs of such increased protection may not be
worth it Those tradeoffs can include even more companies enacting more restrictive
policies regarding communications; this implies further informational inefficiencies.
Certainly a steeper period would give an incentive to make even more company
investment (ire., monitoring costs) against selective disclosure. Yet, some agency costs
inthis area would be inevitable as officers adjust or make simple oversights. See Robert
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harbor for unintentional disclosures. Rather, it underscores the comparative
advantage that cannot be overcome by regulation, an advantage for which analysts
and institutional investors have paid the price.
For instance, by virtue of their training and experience, professionals and
analysts still possess superior understanding as compared with the lay investor.
This translates into an advantage the average investor cannot overcome without
such training. To be sure, there are variations within each class, but, on average,
as between the professional analyst and the average investor, the analyst will be
able to make better use of information even when such information is received
simultaneously by both the analyst and the investor. 12 This is the very nature of
being a professional analyst; analysts have paid the price-years of training and
education-for such an advantage. Rather than calling for heavy-handed
regulation, lay investors also can exploit this advantage by paying its price.
Furthermore, Regulation FD cannot remove the cost the average investor
must pay for access to information.2 13 It is the analyst's job to monitor conference
calls, and he or she has greater economies of scale in this regard. The average
investor, however, must forego other opportunities in order to monitor these calls;
if he or she is not a professional analyst, then these opportunities are probably
more profitable than tuning into a webcast to hear an issuer's management
discussions.214

McGough, E-Mail Snafu Shows "Selective Disclosure"Pitfalls, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11,

2000, at Cl (describing an incident concerning a mistakenly-released e-mail containing
material information). This portends possible litigation expenditures, which may detract
from issuer earnings.
212. See Opdyke, Stocks Hurting,supra note 206 (referring to the investor's
uncertainty as to how to react in the face of a wave of negative earnings
preannouncements).

An analyst naturally has the advantage: less costly access to other material, public
information (measured in foregone opportunities); access to other analysts; quicker
trading mechanisms; and superior understanding of issuers' technical jargon and its
implications. This latter point is especially salient because an issuer need not disclose in
a way that everyone understands. For an example of how analysts still have greater
ability to pay the price for access to material, nonpublic information, see also Jeff D.
Opdyke & Emily Nelson, Conference-CallCrunch: New SE.C. Rule Turns Analysts'
Rite Into a Hectic Affair, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2000, at Cl (describing how frenzied
analysts team-up to relay coverage of conference calls in adapting to Regulation FD).
213. For example, recall that employees who do not regularly communicate with
securities professionals or the issuer's shareholders are not covered by Regulation FD.
See supra note 149. The analyst, thus, has an option the investor realistically does
not-to mine employees who rest underneath the executive level for information.
Regrettably, the very distance that immunizes them from Regulation FD also reduces the
information's accuracy and reliability.
214. Given these disclosures will occur during business hours, the cost of "tuning
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Finally, for the individual investor, Regulation FD lowers the value of the
released information. It does this because, under the regulation, the information
goes from nonpublic to public in the time it takes the nation's semistrong market
to react.215 Thus, any worthwhile, profitable information will be harder to find.
Of course, this arrangement still will benefit those analysts who can assemble a
material patchwork from immaterial swatches. But this sort of analysis requires
time, effort, and skill-the analyst's advantages that elude regulatory grasp. No
regulation realistically can smother the pricing mechanism: one cannot suppress
another's willingness to pay for the advantage that comes from years of schooling
or talking to employees in order to find a profit opportunity. One, however, can
allow the market to work without hindrance so that its systemic benefits can be
realized.
B. Regulation FD Restructures the Incentives
By raising the price of disclosing incrementally, Regulation FD will
restructure the incentives facing the issuer and analysts. Specifically, the
regulation will decrease the disclosure options, leading to a diminished flow of
information and market volatility.
1. Decreasing the Disclosure Options
By making formal what was once informal, Regulation FD narrows the
options available to issuers and analysts. Thus, these transactions will occur less
frequently, andthebenefits that selective disclosureformerlybroughttothemarket
will be diminished.
Now, in order to avoid the need for disclosure (or liability), an issuer's
financial officer and an analyst cannot discuss material, nonpublic information.
The financial officer must consider if any material, nonpublic information (even
the most marginal) is worth the costs of public disclosure." 6 If such information
is deemed worth it ex ante, disclosure will follow.
Presumably, if the information merits such disclosure, an analyst's inquiry
would not be necessary. The disclosure, however, no longer will reflect the
in" for the average investor will mean reduced productivity in his or her own occupation.
This implies a social loss of those services or goods, although such losses defy
measurement The rational investor, when faced with these costs and benefits, quickly
would forego tuning in, and instead rely upon analysts' recommendations and reports as
before. Six-thousand letters to the SEC notwithstanding, this begs the question of
Regulation FD's usefulness.
215. See SELIMAN, supranote 7, at 604.

216. This information ranges from important-but-nonpublic news to marginally
interesting information that just passes an officer's threshold ofperceived materiality.
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information's worth or materiality accurately to particular parties. Rather, it will
primarily reflect the company's desire to avoid liability under the federal laws and
the need for companies to disclose in order to keep up with competitors' increased
disclosures.
In the alternative, if the benefits of disclosure in any particular case-after
being offset by the costs of disclosure-are not deemed worth the price of the
SEC's requirements, thenthe informationremains with the company, untapped and
unused.2 17 Thus, analysts and researchers have an incentive to use costly searches
to uncover information that previously could have been selectively disclosed.21
Regulation FD diminishes the information flow by narrowing the ranges of
disclosed information available to the transacting parties in another way. Stymied
by an officer's imposed silence, analysts will be more motivated to tune in with
other analysts to conference calls or similar broadcasts.219 By forcing such an
emphasis on this means of analyst-executive communication, Regulation FD
formalizes the once informal conference call, thereby increasing the costs
associated with this previously flexible disclosure device."
For instance, the demand for conference calls likely will increase, which
means that more market participants will tune in to receive information. Without
the individual guidance that selective disclosure offered, the conference call will
become a primary source of information for the analyst. With a greater incentive
to tune in, he or she will have to assess the value of competing, simultaneous

217. Ironically, Regulation FD will bring the importance of the analyst as
middleman into sharp relief. If the interaction of Regulation FD and issuer cost
appraisals make some packets of information unreachable to the average investor,
demand will increase for the analyst's ability to relocate disparate pieces of data in time
and space, especially as material, profitable information becomes more scarce. Ofcourse,
Regulation FD will raise the costs ofthese services as material information becomes more
scarce.
218. Or analysts have an incentive to contact the officer and get the information
anyway, relying upon an impaired understanding of materiality or Regulation FD. For
some analysts, the questionwillnot be whether the informationis material and nonpublic,
but whether the financial officer thinks the information is material and nonpublic.
Administrative costs of deciding this question will include increased agency, litigation,
and monitoring costs.
219. This will not be entirely detrimental. Research shows that analysts benefit
from the opportunity to hear other analysts' questions. Frankel et al., supranote 87, at
135. As with any input, though, this is subject to diminishing returns. With more
investors vying for answers, there will be a greater range of questions and, hence, a
greater range of relevance for investors.
220. One commentator has challenged the statutory authority of the SEC to allow
these alternative forms of disclosure as complying with disclosure rules. Conner, supra
note 171, at 254-55.
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conference calls. Without the one-on-one interface characteristic of selective
disclosure, the sacrifice of choosing one call over another is made greater given
finite time and resources. Again, this narrows the options facing the parties.
Moreover, with analysts and fund managers tuning in more, there will be
increased competition for answers to questions that would be queried during the
one-to-one session; thus, analysts mustbemore discriminating aboutthe questions
they ask, whereas before they would have had more latitude in questioning.
Also, to the extent the officers do not have the answers or are unprepared,
they no longer have the option of following up with the analyst Because issuers
are motivatedto disclose, itfollows that officers will endeavor to bemore prepared
forthese conference calls thanwas required inthepast. Suchpreparation (and the
costs of such preparation) was not needed prior to Regulation FD.
In sun, Regulation FD removes the benefits that came from the flexibility of
selective disclosures: low-cost disclosure for issuers, and cheap verification and
clarity for efficiency-enhancing analysts. Because both of these were benefits to
the investor and shareholder, they are impacted, as well.' Instead, information
will remain unaccessed and informational efficiency will be offieL
2. From Inefficiency to Volatility
BecauseRegulationFD poses an assortment ofthreatsto would-be violators,
it creates a fear of liability.' By attaching liability to improper disclosures, the
SEC raised the price of disclosure generally. Now, an issuer's officer must
include the potential of liability when communicating with analysts. Given these
higher costs, directors already have started to institute a prohibition on releasing
such information: silence has become a substitute for communication to the
24
market

221. This is not an unlikely event at all given that earnings reports tend to occur
during the same periods.
222. For a summary of those benefits, see supranotes68-83 and accompanying
text
223. See supranotes 191-96 and accompanying text
224. The National Investors Relations Institute announced that four months after
Regulation FD was enacted twenty-four percent of companies are providing less
information to the market Opdyke, Stocks Hurting,supranote 206.
As to those companies decreasing communication, seeRobartMcGough& CasseU
Bryan-Low, Analysts' EarningsEstimates are Diverging,andS.EC. DisclosureRule
May be the Reason, WAL ST. J., Nov. 2,2000, at C2 (United Air Lines, Inc.); Robert
McGough& Robert GuyMatthews, Clamming Up? Some SeeAlcoaAdoptingthe Silent
Treatment, WALL ST. J., Oct 23, 2000, at C1 (Alcoa); Opdyke, Stocks Hurting,supra
note 206 (Gillette). Other companies are alsoreportedly adopting such aprocedure when
before individual guidance on earnings and estimates was the norm. McGough &
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Because an analyst will not want to incur aider and abetter status, Regulation
FD overdeters. In the face of uncertainty, an analyst's inquiries will be curbed
whether or not they are legitimate. This absence of communication leaves analysts

without a part of the analysis; greater inaccuracy naturally ensues.' This will be
especially clear in volatile industries where wider swings in the prices are the
norm. Hence, variance in the analysts'
pricing of a stock will swell and interfere
6
with fundamental efficiency.
Worse still, inability to predict results leads to surprises when corporations
make earnings announcements. Themarketis ableto absorb negative reports more
smoothly when the information is introduced by analysts.' However, inthe wake
of Regulation FD, corporations are making announcements without analysts
preparing the market, resulting in sudden price dips."5 This type of market
volatility and price oscillation skews the information available to the market, as
well as to individual investors, rendering Regulation FD as regulation ad
229
absurdum.

Matthews, supra. It is unlikely that these are just initial overreactions that will modulate
as the industry adjusts because this appears to be the very type of result that Regulation
FD was designed to create.
225. One analyst has stated that analysts' models lose twenty-five percent of their
accuracy without the information from companies' selective disclosure. JeffD. Opdyke,
Regulation is Altering the Way Anatysts Approach Their Jobs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23,
2000, at Cl [hereinafter Opdyke, Regulation is Altering].
226. See George J. Stigler, The Economics ofinformation, 69 J. PoL. EcoN. 213,
214 (1961) ("Price dispersion is a manifestation-and, indeed, it is the measure-of
ignorance in the market').
An early academic study, however, has called this conclusion into question.
Researchers at the business schools at the University of Southern California and Purdue
University studied the effects of Regulation FD on stock-price volatility after earnings
announcements. Phyllis Plitch, Dire Effects ofDisclosureRule Doubted,WALL ST. J.,
July 24,2001, at C14. The study sampled sixteen-thousand companies and was based
on year 2000 fourth-quarter earnings announcements. Id. The study found no increased
volatility ensuing upon earnings announcements; indeed, the evidence suggested that
volatility decreasedafterRegulation FD was enacted. Id.Others think that a longer time
period is needed before Regulation FD's net effects can be definitively stated. Id.
227. Molly Williams & Robert McGough, Intel's Jolt Shows Shifts in Market's
Dynamics: New DisclosureRules Mean More LegworkAheadforAnalysts, WALL ST.
J., Sept 25, 2000, at Cl.
228. Id.
229. For the effect ofRegulationFD on market prices, see Opdyke, Stocks Hurting,
supra note 206; McGough & Bryan-Low, supranote 224. Analysts' inability to make
betterpredictions without selective disclosure is a powerful vindication ofthose who have
said that analysts have become too reliant upon contacts with chief financial officers.
Opdyke, RegulationisAltering,supranote225. Such results suggest that, when analysts
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V. CONCLUSION

All in all, Regulation FD does achieve its noble goal: individual investors
will have equal access to the information analystshavebeenreceiving. However,
investors may find they do not want to incur the costs of such access. Indeed, the
Supreme Court already has warned ofthe other, unintended results of Regulation
FD: "Imposing a duty to disclose... because a person knowingly receives
material nonpublic information from an insider and trades on it could have an
inhibiting influence onthe role ofmarket analysts. ' As it was inappropriate and
inefficientto bring Rule lOb-5 to bear against selective disclosure, so it is with the
new disclosure requirements.
To argue againsttheidea of fairness is to fight a steeplyuphillbattle; equality
of information is consonant with the nation's democratic, egalitarian notions.
One's burden, however, is alleviated when what appears to be fair is revealed to

be insidious. Regulation FD ostensibly benefits the investor, and in so doing,
entrenches itself, while, in actuality, it subtly, remotely, but undeniably, harms

market efficiency and the investor. One should hope, as does the SEC, that the
renewed investor confidence will compensate.
PATRICK T. MORGAN

are left to their own devices, their cap.city to predict is questionable.
230. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983).
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